Achi news desk-
The result of the 8 February 2024 general elections in Pakistan painted a stark picture of the state of parliamentary Islamic political parties in Pakistan, prompting significant changes in leadership dynamics in the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). During this critical moment, the transition from Sirajul Haq to Hafiz Naeemur Rehman was witnessed, showing a notable transformation within the leadership landscape of the party.
Coming from very different geographical backgrounds and social milieus, Sirajul Haq and Hafiz Naeem rose to leadership roles in Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) through their involvement with its student wing, Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT). While Sirajul Haq has pursued general education (MA in education), Naeem has a degree in civil engineering. Notably, Naeem chooses not to append the title “Engineer” to his name, unlike many within the ranks of JI, a departure reminiscent of the approach of former Afghan Jihadi leader Gul Badin Hekmatyar.
Sirajul Haq could not make any significant political impressions after his party decided to part ways with the Imran Khan-led PTI government in 2018. His party chose to opt for a ‘Solo Flight’ strategy – avoiding electoral alliances – and contested the election only on its proving symbol costly. This approach hardly yielded any tangible results, as predicted by some.
The most significant setback for Sirajul Haq during his tenure as Amir of the JI was the flight of selectmen from Dir, as seen elsewhere, who, along with many die-hard members, joined the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) the popular Imran Khan. Sirajul Haq tried to widen the class base and support for JI by portraying himself as a pious layman with few possessions. Even as the provincial finance minister, he adopted austerity measures by not using air-conditioning facilities or indulging in official luxuries available to ministries. On every Labor Day, which was 1 May, he spent the whole day with the laboring classes, sometimes harvesting crops with farm workers, and other times wearing a red Quli (porter) uniform at the railway station. However, as a leader, he failed to challenge the ruling elites. Under his leadership, JI showed confusion about the war on terror and raised opposition to it, costing JI dearly.
This event gave the impression that what was once considered the vanguard of the Islamic revolution was now left with little public support after Qazi Hussain Ahmed, with only individuals driven by vested interests remaining within the party, most notably those associated with charitable organizations run under the JI umbrella.
This prompted Karachiite Hafiz Naeemur Rehman to turn to populism. From the outset, he and his party were involved in overbilling K-Electric, the private electricity distribution company, ignoring the issue of electricity privatization and even advocating for other companies to be given opportunities to compete with K-Electric in electricity provision . . This was like fighting symptoms while leaving the disease intact. He also addressed the issue of people who would have an impact on Bahria town, as people in protest occupied the offices of the country’s largest housing scheme and took to the streets to protest against alleged fraud in plot allotments. Although he successfully solved problems for some real estate brokers, his campaign yielded no results and was bound to fail when he tried to entertain real estate tycoon Malik Riaz of Bahria Town at the JI office in Karachi. Despite his tireless efforts, he made little impact in a city dominated by PTI and PPP.
When he took charge of the city of Amir, a former JI activist told me that Hafiz Naeem was “a non-governmental type of person.” To attract youth, he started IT courses in Jamat centers. However, this had little effect and led to almost no results in terms of recruitment or votes. In the process, he portrayed himself as the savior of the city on one hand, from the PPP provincial government, and on the other, from MQM and PTI. It was a difficult task and remains unfulfilled, although he gave it linguistic twists and turns and ethnic color to protect the urban Muhajirs and Pashtuns from the attack of rural Sindhis, with the support of the PPP Sindh provincial government. He portrayed himself as the mayor of the city even before the start of the local body elections 2023. Unfortunately, he was not in the good books of the Foundation like Naimat Ullah Khan and Abdul Sattar Afghani before him. Circumstances forced him to align himself with the imprisoned PTI of Imran Khan. However, despite significant support from council members, he was barred – one way or another – from becoming mayor of the country’s largest metropolis. However, his investment of money during local body elections and general elections to promote his political personality made him popular in the JI circles compared to others, and helped him win the slot of JI chief.
Depoliticization of students has had a major impact on JI cadre building. Apart from middle-ranking civil servants, the majority of cadres currently have a background in small and medium-sized businesses
Indeed, it would be a gross mistake to consider him to represent more radical elements within JI. On the contrary, as the newly elected Amir, chosen by pious and righteous members of the JI, Hafiz Naeem can surpass older leaders like Liaquat Baloch, but not radical leaders like former Senator Mushtaq Ahmed and Maulana Hidayat Rahman . How passive the JI cadre is can be judged from the very fact that Syed Munawar Hassan, who tried to take a radical stance on the war against terrorism and gave opposition to it, has been sidelined. Although the Shura or central Jamat body must submit a list of three names, the party cadres can elect any member they wish to choose, including those not included on the list. This time the Shura and the cadre give priority to Hafiz Naeem over the former senator Mushtaq Ahmed, who was very vocal in the Senate and outside the forum as he supported all movements for rights and from below.
Although he is more of a demagogue, Hafiz Naeem has to face the biggest challenge not only from outside but also from within the establishment, where Maulana Hidayat Rahman of Balochistan and Mushtaq Ahmed of KP are contenders for leadership, and each with local support. mass movements.
JI’s class base has always been narrow. Founded closer to the partition of India by Maududi, a religious scholar, JI is typical of an organization of middle-class intellectuals or professional classes in earlier periods, consisting mainly of adherents to literary circles and later on middle-ranking officials in the state. organizations. Based on the Islamic ideology best known as political Islam, they organize similar to Lenin’s Bolsheviks (Communist Party), emphasizing devotion and the organization of dedicated cadres. JI’s most important leadership used to come from the state-run education system. The advent of neoliberalism and the war on terror had an impact on JI.
Today, the IJT student wing, although maintaining a presence in public educational institutions, has almost no political presence in private educational institutions. Depoliticization of students has had a major impact on JI cadre building. Apart from middle-ranking officers, at present, the majority of cadres have a background in small and medium-sized businesses, which are mainly involved in running private schools, clinics, small hospitals, pharmaceutical businesses, and real estate and housing schemes .
Sirajul Haq could not bridge the present with the recent past—not in terms of Dawah or in the field of parliamentary politics—or make any impression as a challenger to oppressive regimes. Although he is more energetic and populist compared to his predecessor, Hafiz Naeem, using more radical language, he does not have the background of a radical leader or support for such elements.
However, under the leadership of Hafiz Naeemur Rehman, the new Amir of JI, it all depends on the situation on the ground and the social background of the dedicated cadre, the so-called ‘Arakeen,’ to take JI to the pinnacles of influence and which were once considered the hallmark of political Islam.
